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Abstract  
We study the effect of post-compulsory education on crime by exploiting a 
regression discontinuity design generated by admission cut-offs to upper 
secondary schools in Finland. We combine data on school applications with data 
on criminal convictions and follow individuals for 10 years. Our results show 
that successful applicants are less likely to commit crimes during the first five 
years after admission. Crime is reduced both during and outside the school year, 
indicating that the channel through which schooling affects crime cannot be 
explained by incapacitation alone. We find no effect on crime committed after 6 
years from admission. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is well established that individuals with low levels of educational attainment are vastly over-
represented among criminal offenders.
1
 Over the recent decades, the empirical literature has also 
progressed in addressing the causality of this relationship. Several papers have examined the effects 
of changes in the amount of compulsory schooling on crime and reported that the extension of 
compulsory schooling typically reduces crime. However, still not much is known about the 
mechanisms through which education reduces crime. For example, it is still unclear to what extent 
attending more years of school reduces crime by simply incapacitating individuals through keeping 
them off the streets or by increasing the opportunity cost of crime through higher human capital.
2
 
Furthermore, there is a clear lack of evidence on the effects of participation in post-compulsory 
schooling on crime—even though this is a margin of educational attainment that is crucial for 
learning skills that are directly relevant in the labour market. 
 
In this paper, we exploit data on post-compulsory school admissions and longitudinal crime records 
to compare the crime trajectories of individuals who succeed in gaining admission to post-
compulsory education to crime trajectories of those who are rejected. The Finnish education system 
bases admissions to post-compulsory education programmes on the end-of-compulsory school 
grade point average (GPA) of the applicants. In the case of programmes that are over-subscribed, 
this admission mechanism generates a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that allows us to 
compare the outcomes of the individuals that were just above the admission cut-off  with the 
outcomes of those that just failed to be accepted. By linking these admission data to administrative 
data on criminal convictions we can estimate the causal effect of being admitted to post-compulsory 
schooling on crime. Furthermore, the ability to follow individuals over time allows us to 
                                                 
1
 According to Harlow (2003), 68% of State prison inmates in the United States did not have a high school diploma in 
late 1990’s. In Finland, 48 % of all offenders, and 75 % of those sentenced to prison, had no post-compulsory degrees 
in year 2011, while the corresponding figure among the same age population was 15 percent. (Aaltonen et al, 2011). 
2
 Lochner (2011) provides a survey on the theoretical and the empirical literature on the effect of education on crime. 
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disentangle the immediate incapacitation effects of admittance from long-term human capital 
effects. 
 
Previous studies on education and crime have mainly relied on variation in compulsory schooling 
age across jurisdictions and cohorts to identify the causal effect of the length of schooling on crime. 
Lochner and Moretti (2004), Machin et al. (2011) and Hjalmarsson et al. (2015) exploit variation 
generated by changes in compulsory schooling laws in the US, the UK and Sweden, respectively. 
The results in these papers provide evidence that educational attainment, measured in years of 
schooling, reduces crime. In the previous literature, attempts at isolating the incapacitation effect of 
education have either focused on the effects of compulsory schooling laws on juvenile crime 
(Anderson 2014; Beatton et al. 2016) or have exploited events such as temporary school closures to 
examine the contemporaneous relationship between schooling hours and juvenile crime (Jacob and 
Lefgren 2003; Luallen 2006). Landersø et al. (2015) and Cook and Kang (2016), on the other hand, 
find evidence on the incapacitation effect by exploiting variation in the school starting age. 
 
However, to the best of our knowledge, very few papers have attempted to disentangle 
incapacitation and human capital channels within the same empirical setting.
3
 This paper aims to fill 
this gap in the literature. We use an RD design to study whether failure to be admitted into post-
compulsory education has a causal effect on criminal activity over the 10-year follow-up period. 
The key to our analysis is the Finnish registry data that allow us to link individual records from the 
school application registry with records on education, crime and labour market outcomes, over a 
period of several years. These data make it possible to disentangle the different mechanisms 
through which schooling may affect criminal activity. For example, we can investigate whether 
criminal behaviour is affected during school terms during the years individuals are still enrolled at 
                                                 
3
 In a recent paper, Bell et al (2018) study the effect of changes in compulsory schooling age in the United States and 
Australia on crimes at different ages and finds evidence that most of the effect of the compulsory schooling derives 
from incapacitation. 
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school or, alternatively, after they obtain a post-compulsory degree that increases the returns to 
legitimate work. Similarly, we can examine whether the effect of education varies across types of 
crime.  
 
In addition to disentangling mechanisms, our paper also provides new evidence on the effect of 
post-compulsory education on crime. We argue that is an important margin of education since post-
compulsory education typically provides individuals with skills that are of direct relevance in the 
labour market. We are aware of only three earlier papers that focus on the effect of post-compulsory 
education on crime. Two papers explore variation in the supply of post-compulsory education 
across cohorts and regions (Machin et al.2012, Brugård and Falch 2013). Both find that expansion 
of post-compulsory schooling is associated with reduction in the aggregate crime (or imprisonment) 
rate in the location. Åslund et al. (2018) examine a reform that extended the length of vocational 
education from two to three years in Sweden, and find evidence that property crime decreased 
during the additional enrolment year. Our paper differs from these papers in that we study the effect 
of post-compulsory schooling at the extensive margin and can follow individuals’ crime patterns 
during and after the post-compulsory school enrolment. Moreover, we are able to identify the effect 
of gaining entry to post-compulsory education without using variation generated by reforms that 
probably affected the content of the post-compulsory schooling as well. 
 
Our results indicate that admission to post-compulsory schooling has a negative effect on the 
probability of committing any kind of crime within five years after the admission. However, we 
find that the differences between criminal activity of successful and unsuccessful candidates 
decrease in the long run, indicating that the crime reducing effect of schooling is driven by the 
incapacitation effect of schooling. Yet, the negative effect of gaining admission to post-compulsory 
schooling on crime occurs during both school terms and breaks, suggesting that the incapacitating 
 4 
effect of schooling is more extensive than simply the physical presence at school. When 
distinguishing between different types of crimes, we find that the admission to upper secondary 
school mainly affects property, traffic and other crimes (drug-related)   while having no effect on 
violent crime. All these effects are driven by the effect of education on criminal behaviour among 
men. We find no effects on criminal activity among women. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the school application 
system in Finland. Section 3 presents the data and discusses the definition of the running variable 
and the threshold. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and provides a graphical presentation of 
our research design and the regression results. This section also discusses the potential mechanism. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Upper secondary school admissions in Finland 
 
The context of our analysis is the Finnish post-compulsory school application system. The length of 
compulsory schooling in Finland is nine years. Compulsory school ends in the summer of the 
calendar year when the student turns sixteen. After finishing compulsory education, students can 
apply to secondary schools. Secondary schools are divided into two tracks: an academic track which 
is general in nature and provides basis for access to tertiary education and a vocational track that 
prepares students for specific occupations, such as hair dresser, car mechanic etc. Figure A1 
describes the structure of the Finnish education system. 
 
In order to gain access to secondary school, students have to apply through a centralized application 
system maintained by the Finnish National Board of Education (FNBE). The application process is 
depicted in Figure 1. The process starts during the February-March period in the final 9
th
 year of 
 5 
compulsory school. Individuals can apply to up to five different educational programmes (either 
programmes in different schools or different programmes within schools). The allocation of places 
in each programme is based on a programme-specific admission score. For most schools, this score 
is solely based on average grades from the last (9
th
) year of compulsory school. Some schools give 
extra points for experience and minority gender, or use aptitude tests in addition to grades. In 
addition, the weights given to different criteria vary across schools and across programs. As can be 
seen from Figure 1, the applicants only receive their compulsory school GPA’s in May –some two 
months after submitting applications. This means that applicants do not know their own admission 
points or the admission thresholds when applying. All this should make strategic application 
behaviour very difficult. 
 
Student selection to each programme follows a DA algorithm where each applicant is considered 
for her preferred choice in the first round. Each programme tentatively accepts applicants according 
to its selection criteria up to its capacity and rejects lower-ranking students. In the next rounds, the 
applicants rejected in the previous round are considered for their next preferred programme. Each 
programme compares these applicants to the admitted applicants from previous rounds, rejecting 
the lowest-ranking students in excess of its capacity. The algorithm terminates when every 
applicant is matched to a track or every unmatched candidate is rejected by every track she had 
listed in her application. At the end of this automated admission stage, in June of the final year of 
compulsory school, the applicants receive an offer according to the allocation result. Admitted 
applicants have two weeks to accept the offer based on the automated admission process while 
rejected applicants are placed on a waiting list in rank order based on their admission score. After 
these two weeks, the schools start to fill the remaining vacant slots by calling the applicants in their 
waiting list in rank order. 
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Each year around 5 percent of students fail to obtain a place in upper secondary schools in Finland, 
although there are more slots than the number of compulsory school leavers. The reason for this is 
that older cohorts can also apply for upper secondary school places.
4
 Typically, these older 
applicants have been accepted in previous years but wish to switch to another programme. Older 
applicants also include applicants who were rejected by the programmes they applied to in previous 
years. The main educational options for applicants not accepted to secondary education are the 
optional 10
th
 grade in comprehensive school and preparatory vocational training. However, as the 
failed applicants have finished compulsory schooling they are under no obligation to study and can 
also try to find employment. 
 
3. Data, Sample and Variables  
 
3.1 Data 
 
Our primary data set is the Finnish joint application registry which contains information on all the 
Finnish students that graduate from compulsory school and apply for secondary education. As 
nearly everyone applies, these data practically cover full cohorts of 16 year-olds in Finland. The 
data include information on grades in all subjects at the end of compulsory school (Mathematics, 
Finnish, English, History, etc.), grade point average, compulsory school ID, applications to 
secondary schools in preference ranking, programme codes for programmes applied to, admission 
scores (for each programme individual applies to), as well as information on whether the applicant 
was offered a slot in secondary school programmes, whether she was put on a waiting list and 
whether she accepted the slot she was offered. The data also contain a unique person identification 
code that allows us to link the data to other registers and follow individuals over time. 
                                                 
4
 Every year around 30-40 percent of all applicants to secondary schools had finished their compulsory schooling before 
the application year. 
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We focus on seven cohorts that graduated from compulsory school during 1996-2003 and applied to 
secondary education in the year they finished comprehensive school. We merge this information 
with data from several sources: from Employment Statistics that contain information on main 
activity (employment, unemployment, student etc.) and taxable earnings by source (wages, 
unemployment benefits, student grants, etc.); from the Register on Degrees and Examinations that 
contains the date and the type of completed degrees from all Finnish educational institutions; from 
the Student register that reports enrolment in education; and, finally, from data on prosecutions, 
sentences and punishments containing all convictions from criminal courts. We follow the target 
cohorts in these registers up to 2013. 
 
The conviction data are based on all decisions by district courts. These data have information on the 
type of punishment (no conviction, fine, conditional imprisonment and unconditional 
imprisonment) and the type of crime (four-digit conviction classification). The data also contain 
information on both the timing of crime (date), and timing of conviction (year), and the principal 
crime for each conviction and the length of possible prison sentences. The main outcome measure 
for criminal activity, “Any conviction”, is an indicator for whether individual has been convicted 
for any crime in district court. In addition, we measure convictions by type of crime and sentence. 
 
In Figure 2, we plot the crime-age profiles from the conviction data. The minimum age of criminal 
responsibility is 15 in Finland. The crime rates increase from age 16 and peak at ages 19 to 20 
which is common to crime-age profiles reported in countless earlier studies. Property crimes are 
clearly the most common crime category. The share of traffic violations increases from age 18 
which is the age when Finnish youth can obtain a driver’s license. At all ages, most convictions lead 
to fines or conditional imprisonment. Unconditional imprisonment is rare before age 19 but the 
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severity of crimes and, therefore, the share of imprisonment also increases with age (Reported in 
Appendix Figure A2). As most Finnish students apply to upper secondary schooling the year that 
they turn 16 and most secondary school programmes last for three years, the students who enrol in 
secondary schools immediately after comprehensive school graduate at ages 19-20 when the crime 
rates are at their highest. 
 
3.2 Definition of the threshold 
 
As explained above, the admission system generates offers at several stages. The first offers are sent 
based on the automated DA algorithms and the applicants have two weeks to accept or reject these 
offers. The application register data reveal that sufficiently large numbers of offers are turned down 
at this stage so that there is no visible discontinuity based on the automated offers that we could 
exploit in our analysis. After the two weeks have passed from the initial offers, the schools start to 
fill vacant slots by calling those applicants who are on the waiting list (which is ranked according to 
admission points). In our data, the applicant is defined as being admitted after this round of calls 
and we define the admission cut-off score as the admission points of the last applicant admitted 
from the waiting list. Some admitted applicants, however, choose not to enroll in the programme 
and many schools have open slots/vacancies  after the commencement of school year in August. 
Therefore, the enrolment does not correspond one-to-one with surpassing the admittance threshold 
in our data but we focus on enrolment as one outcome that is potentially affected by admittance. 
 
3.3 Sample Construction 
Our goal is to exploit the post-compulsory secondary education programme admission cut-offs to 
estimate the causal effect of school admission on crime. We have data on a total 476,476 first-time 
applicants to 17,047 programme-year combinations over seven years. In principle, each 
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programme-year combination has an admission threshold that could be used in this analysis. 
However, in order to use the applications in our regression discontinuity design we need to restrict 
the number of programmes in four ways. First, in order to be able to measure the admission cut-offs 
using admission scores that are observable in our data, we only include programmes that rank their 
candidates on the basis of admission points in our analysis sample. This restriction excludes some 
special education programmes that use alternative criteria for admission. Second,  we include only 
programmes that reject some applicants. This restriction excludes under-subscribed programmes 
from our analysis sample. Third, as we are interested in the effect of gaining entry to any secondary 
education, we concentrate on programmes that are critical at this margin in the sense that at least 
some of the applicants would remain without a slot in any secondary school if they fail to surpass 
the cut-off. In practice, we define these programmes as the ones that have the lowest threshold for at 
least some applicants (among the set of programmes that that they applied to). Finally, for our 
regression discontinuity strategy to work, we need a sufficient amount of applicants for whom the 
programme is critical and who are sufficiently close to the threshold. In what follows, we use two 
criteria for sufficient mass by looking at thresholds that have either one or five applicants within a 
unit of the admission scores at both sides of the entry threshold for whom that particular programme 
was critical in the sense that it was their best chance of gaining entry to post-compulsory secondary 
education. 
 
The restrictions outlined above reduce our sample size significantly ( as shown in table A1 in the 
Appendix). When focusing on programmes that are critical for at least one applicant within a unit of 
the admission score on both sides of the cut off, the number of programs drops from the total of 
16,969 programme/year–combinations to 4,169. We call this set of programmes Sample 1. When 
we further restrict the sample to programmes with at least five candidates for whom the programme 
is critical within a unit of the admission score on both sides of cut off, the number of programmes 
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drops to 669. These programmes had 62,158 applicants between 1996 and 2003. This sample is our 
preferred analysis sample (Sample 2). In this sample, 6,737 applicants were rejected from all 
programs they applied to.  
 
In the Appendix Table A1, we provide a detailed comparison between the tracks and the applicants 
used in the analysis, with the full population of tracks and applicants. Panel A in Table A1 reveals 
that the tracks in the analysis sample are relatively large and concentrated in bigger cities. The 
analysis sample tracks are also more likely to be academic high school tracks (because these are on 
average larger) than all tracks in the full data. The minimum GPA for the admitted applicants in the 
analysis sample tracks is slightly lower than in the other tracks. In Panel B of Table A1, we 
compare the accepted and rejected candidates in these tracks. The rejected candidates have 
obviously lower GPAs, are more likely to be foreign born and more likely to live in large cities and 
have a less favourable family background. 
 
Table A1 also reports the mean values of our main outcomes of interest. Admitted applicants are 
less likely to commit crimes both in the full population, 0.05 versus 0.12 within three years of the 
admission, as well as in our analysis samples, 0.04 versus 0.12 in sample 1 and 0.03   versus 0.10 in 
sample 2.  The baseline differences in the probability of committing crimes are relatively similar 
across the two analysis samples and the full population. The difference in the crime rates remains 
and gets even large by the tenth year since admission. 
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3.4 Running variable 
 
In our regression discontinuity framework, we use admission scores as the running variable. While 
the main determinant of the admission scores in all programmes is GPA from compulsory 
schooling, different schools apply different scales, give different weights to different grades and 
some use also other criteria in addition to GPA. To make the running variable comparable across 
different educational programmes, we rescale the admission scores to GPA units.
5
 The programme-
specific cut-off scores are defined on the basis of the lowest-scoring candidate that was observed 
being offered place to this programme. We drop the observations that are used to define the cut-off 
score from the analysis. The running variable, 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑡,  for applicant i to a track k in a year t is defined 
as her distance to the cut-off point 𝜏𝑘𝑡 in GPA units.  
 
𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (𝑐𝑖𝑘𝑡 − 𝜏𝑘𝑡) 
 
These programme-specific running variables equal zero at the cut-off point for each programme in a 
given year. Figure 3 displays the distribution of this standardized running variable in our estimation 
sample. As shown in Figure 3, the cut-off scores are on the left tail of the distribution, but the 
distribution is smooth around the threshold. Table A2 shows that there is no discontinuity in the 
background characteristics of applicants at the cut-off. 
 
  
                                                 
5
 In practice we estimate programme-specific regression models where admission scores are explained with the GPA 
and then divide the score with the coefficient of GPA. This way, a one unit change in GPA has the same effect on the 
rescaled scores in each programme. 
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4. Empirical Strategy and Results 
 
4.1. Graphical presentation of the reduced-form effects 
 
Before turning to the regression results, we begin with a graphical presentation of the reduce-form 
impact of receiving an offer to post-compulsory schooling. The upper panel of Figure 4 plots offers 
and enrolments to post-compulsory education as a function of the standardized admission scores 
using sample 2. Each dot in the figure corresponds to the fraction admitted or enrolled within a bin 
of 0.1 GPA units. 
 
In the upper left-hand side panel of Figure 4, we plot the fraction admitted applicants. As the 
admission threshold is defined based on the lowest-scoring admitted candidate, there are no 
admissions below the cut-off point. At the cut-off point, the share admitted jumps to 0.75. There is a 
clear discontinuity but the admission rate still remains well below 100%. Technically, this implies 
that some applicants on the waiting list did not receive an offer even though a person with a lower 
score in the waiting list was admitted. This could be due to some applicants not being reached at the 
point when schools fill their vacancies from the waiting list or simply due to measurement error in 
admission scores. For our analysis, this implies that the admission cut-offs do not work as a sharp 
regression discontinuity design for admissions but rather that passing the admission cut-off 
discontinuously increases the probability of being admitted to post-compulsory secondary school. 
In what follows, we estimate both the reduced-form estimates of passing the admission threshold on 
our outcomes of interest as well as the local average treatment effect (LATE) of being admitted 
where admissions are instrumented with being above the threshold. 
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The figure in the upper right-hand panel of Figure 4 plots the enrolment in post-compulsory 
education as a function of admission scores. The enrolment figure differs from admission mainly in 
the part below the cut-off scores. Many applicants that are not admitted in the admission process 
apply to schools directly during the months after the process has ended and are eventually  enrolled 
in secondary education by the end of the year when they finish compulsory school. However, there 
is still a clear discontinuity, with the enrolment rates in post-compulsory education increasing from 
about 0.4 to about 0.8 at the cut-off score. 
 
The figure in the lower left-hand panel plots the share of those admitted to any education, including 
both 10
th
 grade and post-compulsory education. Most applicants that do not get into post-
compulsory education are placed in voluntary 10
th
 grade in compulsory school or in preparatory 
vocational education and are hence classified as being in education. The discontinuity at the cut-off 
point is still visible but the fraction in education only increases by about 15% at the cut-off. The 
lower right-hand panel of Figure 4 shows the share that has completed a post-compulsory degree 
within 10 years of finishing compulsory school. There is a clear jump in the probability of obtaining 
a degree in 10 years at the admission cut-off suggesting that successful admission also has long-
term consequences for final educational attainment, even though the rejected individuals can apply 
again in the following years. 
 
In Figure 5, we plot the propensity to commit any crime that leads to conviction in a district court 
within three and ten years after post-compulsory school admission as a function of the standardized 
admission score. The results show that there is a visible discontinuity in the probability of 
conviction at the admission cut-off. Those who exceed the post-compulsory school admission 
threshold are less likely to be convicted during the 3 or 10 year follow-up after the possible school 
admission than those who fail to exceed the admission cut-off. 
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Taken together, the descriptive evidence in Figures 4 and 5 suggests that receiving an offer to post-
compulsory schooling may significantly increase enrolment in secondary education and reduce 
criminal behaviour. Overall, these descriptive figures shed light on the possibility that getting an 
offer to a post-compulsory education programme can affect criminal behaviour —both through 
incapacitation and keeping the youth off the street, and by increasing human capital. 
 
4.2. Regression Analysis  
 
To examine how admission to upper secondary school affects an individual’s crime and labor 
market outcomes, we use the Sample 2 data in a RDD regression framework that exploits the 
admission cut-offs to identify the effect of post-compulsory education on our outcomes of interest. 
The reduced form of interest is: 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘𝑡 + 𝜌𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡 + (1 − 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡)𝑓0(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑓0(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑡   (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 is the outcome variable (e.g. admission, enrollment, completed degree, criminal 
conviction) for applicant i to track k in year t. 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡  is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
applicant is above the cut-off to track k in year t, and 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑡 is the running variable that is centered 
around the cut-off point (gets value 0 at cut-off). The effects of the running variable are controlled 
by a linear function, 𝑓0(𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑡). The equation includes an interaction term that allows the effect of the 
running variable to differ on different sides of the cut-off. We pool data on all programs and 
therefore have 569 indicator variables and their interactions with the running variable in our 
regressions. 𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑡 summarizes the unobserved factors. 
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We estimate the equation (1) using nonparametric local linear regression with triangular kernel 
weights and optimal bandwidth for each programme-year combination derived using the selection 
procedure in Calonico et. al. (2014). In addition to our reduced-form specification, we also use our 
setting as a fuzzy RD design to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of being 
admitted to post-compulsory education. We define the treatment variable for these regression, 𝐷𝑖, to 
indicate that an applicant is observed to receive an offer in the data. The first stage regression of this 
fuzzy RD strategy is the specification (1) where the outcome variable is admission.  
 
4.3 Main Results 
 
Table 1 reports the main results of our regression analysis. We begin by reporting the results for all 
school applicants in Panel A and then split the sample by gender in Panel B (Males) and Panel C 
(Females). We estimate the effect of admission on enrolment to secondary school in the fall after 
the admission and on the probability of at least one conviction by one, three, five and ten years after 
the admission. 
 
The first row of Table 1 reports the reduced-form effect of exceeding the admission threshold on 
enrolment and crime. In the second row we report the first-stage estimate, i.e. the effect of 
exceeding the admission threshold on receiving an offer from at least one secondary program. In the 
third row, we report the local average treatment effects (LATE), measuring the effect of an offer on 
the outcome in each column. In the last row, we report the mean of each outcome variable below 
the admission threshold within the optimal bandwidth. 
 
As the first stage results on the second row of Table 1 show, scoring above the cut-off score 
naturally has a large effect on the likelihood of receiving an offer and  the first stage estimates are 
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thus large and significant. Admission also has a strong effect on the enrolment in post-compulsory 
education in the next fall reported in column (1) of Table 1. It increases by 52 percentage points for 
male applicants and 66 percentage points for female applicants. 
 
The effects on crime are reported in columns (2)-(5). The result for the whole sample in column (5) 
of Panel A suggests that those above the admission threshold are less likely to commit crimes over 
the whole follow-up period. Although we see no effect on crimes committed during the first school 
year immediately following admission, in column (2), the difference starts to show up within three 
to five years in columns (3) and (4). When splitting the sample by gender (Panels B and C), we find 
that the effect on crime is totally driven by male applicants. In general, the crime rates are much 
lower for the girls and admission to secondary education has no significant effect on any of our 
measures of crime for females. For male applicants, on the other hand, the admission clearly 
decreases the propensity to commit crime both in the medium and long-term. The IV (LATE) effect 
indicates that being admitted to upper secondary schooling decreases the probability of committing 
any type of crime by 7 percentage points within three years of admission, which corresponds to 
53% reduction when compared to the mean below the cut-off (0.127). Within 5 years after 
admission, the reduction has increased to 12 percentage points (57 % when compared with the 
mean level below the cut-off, 20 %). The total crime during the whole follow-up period has 
decreased by 10.5 percentage points (39%).  
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4.4 The timing of crime effects 
 
The results in Table 1 clearly indicate that being admitted to post-compulsory education has a 
negative effect on criminal activity among boys. However, the pattern of results in Table 1 is 
consistent with both the incapacitating effect of education as well as with the human capital 
enhancing effect. One way to disentangle these mechanisms from each other is to look at the timing 
of the effects of admission on crime more closely. If gaining admission reduces crime primarily 
during the years when the admitted applicants are most likely to be enrolled, we would argue that 
admissions reduce crime mainly through the incapacitating effects. However, if admissions lead to 
reductions in crime that only emerge over the long run, the results would be more in line with the 
human capital mechanism. 
 
Figure 6 plots the estimates of the effect of admissions on crime by each school year (starting 
August 15
th
) from the pre-admission year until 10 years after the admission. In order to make sure 
that we follow same individuals throughout these ten years, we use a fixed bandwidth instead of 
track- and year-specific optimal bandwidths in these regressions. Reassuringly for our identification 
strategy, the results indicate no pre-admission difference in the criminal behaviour among boys. 
Neither do we see any clear impact on crime during the first post-admission school year. However, 
the gap between the annual crime rates of the admitted and non-admitted boys starts to increase 
during the second and third years after admission and remains below zero until year 5, although 
these annual estimates are quite imprecise. 
 
Figure 7, on the other hand, plots the effect of admission on the probability of having at least one 
conviction as a function of the number of years from the post-compulsory school admission. The 
negative effect of admission on this cumulative crime outcome starts to emerge during the time 
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when the admitted individuals are still likely to be enrolled and it continues to increase after this. 
However, in the long run the difference in the probability of at least one conviction between the 
admitted and non-admitted male applicants disappears. 
 
Taken together, the results in Figures 6 and 7 are consistent with the incapacitating effect of 
schooling on crime. However, this incapacitation effect seems to be dynamic in nature and matches 
findings by Bell et al. (2018), who document similar effects using variation generated by a 
compulsory schooling extension in Australia. This kind of dynamic incapacitation keeps individuals 
enrolled during the time when they are most likely to start criminal careers and this effect persists 
also after finishing post-compulsory education since the lack of a criminal record increases relative 
returns to legitimate work. However, the results in Figure 6 and 7 do not give much support for the 
human capital channel as we fail to find enduring effects of schooling on crime. 
 
4.5 The effects by types of crime 
 
The effects of post-compulsory admission on different types of crime can also shed light on the 
mechanisms through which it reduces crime. Previous literature (e.g. Jacob and Lefgren 2003) has 
documented that the incapacitating effect of schooling on crime varies by types of crime. 
Adolescents are less likely to commit property crimes when in school, while violent crime may 
even increase during school hours. Thus, if we expect schooling to reduce crime through 
incapacitation, we would expect to see bigger reductions in property crime than in violent crime. 
 
In Figure 8 and in Table 2 we examine separately the effects on crimes by crime type with fixed 
(Figure 8) and optimal bandwidths (Table 2). Figure 8 shows that the admission to post-compulsory 
education actually increases violent crime slightly during the first school year. This is in line with 
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the results in Jacob and Lefgren (2003) who found that interactions at school may increase violent 
crime. At the same time, however, we see that admission decreases the probability of committing 
property, traffic and other crimes (including for example drug related offenses) from year 2 until 
year 5 after admission. After year 6, the difference in the cumulative crime rates between admitted 
and non-admitted remains quite stable. This pattern of the effects by crime types is again more 
consistent with the incapacitation than with the human capital channel. The results with optimal 
bandwidth (Table 2) are similar. 
 
4.6 The effects within school year 
 
To further examine the incapacitation channel, we investigate the timing of criminal activity more 
carefully. In Table 3 we report the effect of being above the admission threshold on the probability 
of committing a crime during the school year (from August 15th to May 30th) and during summer 
holiday breaks (from June 1
st
 to August 14
th
). As previously, we find no clear impact on the 
propensity to commit crime during the first year after admission. By the third year, however, there 
is a clear reduction in crime committed during the school term as well as during the summer 
holidays. These results indicate that the contemporaneous effect of schooling on crime is more 
complex than just incapacitation channel. Those admitted to upper secondary school may be more 
active (in employment) during the summer holiday breaks as well, or simply interact with less 
crime-prone peers.  
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4.7 The effects on inactivity and educational attainment 
 
Our data also allows us to examine the effect of admission on male inactivity and the likelihood of 
eventually completing a degree in Table 4. The results in Table 4 indicate that admission to post-
compulsory education decreases the probability that a male applicant is not in education, nor in 
employment (NEET) in the following autumn by 14 percentage point. This is a big decrease (94 %) 
when compared with the baseline inactivity (15%). For females, there is a similar decrease in 
percentage points, although the baseline is higher (19%). 
 
In Figure 9, we report the results on the effect of gaining admission on NEET in different years 
since possible admission. Gaining admission to post-compulsory education has a negative effect on 
the probability of being inactive during the first three years after the admission. However, after this 
the effect disappears. This pattern of results suggests that schooling may reduce crime among boys 
by keeping them active. Interestingly, we find no clear impact on crime rates during the first year 
after admission, although those not admitted are significantly more likely to be inactive. It may be 
that inactivity may not result in an immediate change in criminal behaviour and that the 
incapacitation effects of schooling may occur with a lag. 
 
Although the timing of the crime effects, the effects by crime types and the effects on the inactivity 
are broadly consistent with the incapacitation mechanism, it is still possible that our failure to find 
evidence on the human capital channel is because gaining admission does not have any effect on the 
final educational attainment of the applicants. To rule out this possibility, we present the estimates 
of the effect of admission on the probability of graduation from post-compulsory education by three 
and ten years from admission, respectively, in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4. The results indicate 
that admission clearly increases the probability of obtaining a post-compulsory degree by the third 
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year since admission for both boys (20 percentage points) and girls (29 percentage points), 
especially when compared to the baseline- which is only around 12 percentage. When comparing 
the probability of having obtained the degree by year 10 since admission, the difference diminishes, 
but remains significant. The results indicate that admission affects the timing of obtaining a degree 
for both genders, but also has an impact on completed education for males. Hence, admission 
should increase human capital even though we fail to find evidence for the human capital channel 
of crime reduction. 
 
4.8 Robustness 
 
Robustness with respect to control variables 
To check that our results are not driven by some observable differences the admitted and non-
admitted applicants around the entry threshold, Table A3 presents the results from the same set of 
regressions as in Table 1, with control variables for mother tongue of the applicant, age at 
graduation, gender, parental education and for living in one of the 15 largest cities in Finland. The 
results are robust to inclusion of controls. 
 
Robustness to bandwidth choice and sample 
One potentially disturbing pattern in the results above is the fact that the samples dictated by the 
outcome specific bandwidths vary a lot in size. In order to check how sensitive our results are to the 
choice of samples, we report with a fixed bandwidth in Table A4. The main results remain robust: 
being above the admission cut-off increases the probability of obtaining a degree and reduces crime. 
The clearest change is to the crime outcome in year 10: the sample is now much bigger and the 
effect on crime by year 10 does decrease. To further investigate this, we also report how sensitive 
our results are to choice of bandwidth. The Figure A3 reports the effect on cumulative crime by 
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year 5 and 10, and cumulative property and traffic crimes by year 5, for males using different 
bandwidth choices. Our results indicate that our results are not sensitive to choice of bandwidth as 
long as the bandwidth does not exceed 0.5. The effects do get smaller when the bandwidth size gets 
very large. 
 
Alternative sample design 
In order to make sure we have enough observations around each cut-off point, we have used quite 
restrictive sample definitions and, as a result, have lost a big share of our data (as shown in table 
A1). In order to check how sensitive our results are to these restrictions, we use another sample 
where we restrict the data to applicants to programmes with at least 1 applicant for whom the 
program was his or her best chance to get into any program on both sides of the admission cut off. 
In these regressions we pool the data, and use same specification for all programs, since we are no 
longer able to use program specific running variables. Results are reported in table A5. The results 
are in line with our main analysis: Being above the admission threshold significantly reduced the 
propensity to commit crime, while increasing the propensity to finish a degree and being inactive. 
Again, the effect on cumulative crime is more robust.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
While a large literature has documented the relationship between crime and education, we still 
know little about the mechanism how education influences criminal behavior. Two channels have 
been emphasized in the previous literature: the incapacitation impact of schooling, and the human 
capital accumulation which makes the opportunity cost of crime and punishments more costly. In 
this study, we aim to understand these channels further by exploiting the admission cut-offs to post 
-compulsory schooling in Finland to estimate the long-term effects school entry on crime. We 
follow individuals near the admission cut-offs for several years after the admission date, to 
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understand whether the effect of school entry on criminal behaviour occurs during the time when 
individuals are still in school, or after they have obtained formal degrees and entered the labour 
market.  
 
Our results show that being successful in upper secondary school admission decreases the 
likelihood of committing crimes within five years of the admission by 12 percentage points (60 % 
decrease in crime propensity) among boys. The effect is sizeable when compared with previous 
estimates that have exploited variation in the length of schooling generated by changes in 
compulsory schooling.
6
 The effects on cumulative crime are still visible ten years after finishing 
compulsory school but these effects are driven by effects that take place relatively soon after 
finishing comprehensive school. The effects of education on crime do partly coincide with the 
effects of education on non-participation rates, suggesting that the incapacitation channel is one 
possible mechanism. The effect is driven by reduction in property, traffic and other offences (drug-
related), with no impact on violent crimes, which is in line with previous findings that the 
incapacitation effect of schooling mainly reduces property crime. However, when investigating the 
timing of crime in detail, we find that there is a similar reduction in crimes committed during 
holiday breaks as well. In addition, we find that difference in crime rates between admitted and 
non-admitted do not show up immediately, but within 2 to 3 years from admission. We find no 
effects for crime propensity 6-10 years after school admission, indicating that the school entry had 
no long-lasting effect on criminal behaviour.       
 
 
                                                 
6
 Jakob and Lechner (2001) find that juvenile property crime decreases by 14 percent on days when school is in session. 
Lochner and Moretti (2004) find that a one-year increase in average education levels in a state reduces state-level arrest 
rates by 11 percent or more.  Hjalmarsson et al. 2015 find that one additional year of compulsory schooling leads to a 
6.7.% reduction in convictions using Swedish compulsory school reform and data.  A more recent paper by Bell et al. 
2018, find a 6 %  reduction in crime arrest rates in the US following different compulsory school reforms, and an 11 % 
reduction in Australia. 
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The results indicate that while the immediate incapacitation channel of schooling may be important, 
the effect of schooling on crime may work through other channels as well. There may be several 
mechanisms in play that explain why school entry may reduce crime with delay: Individuals who do 
not enrol in school may be more likely to interact with more crime-prone peers and it may take time 
before inactive juveniles start engaging in criminal activity.
7
 The delayed effects are also in line 
with the dynamic incapacitation effects of schooling (Bell et al. 2018). Individuals who are enrolled 
at school at a critical age  may have a lower propensity to commit crimes in the future as well. It is 
important to keep in mind that our focus has been on young individuals that are just at the 
beginning of the years when crime rates are highest; most are 16 years old when applying to upper 
secondary schooling. Being unsuccessful in school entry during this critical age may have severe 
consequences on these adolescents, not only through directly keeping them active and off the street, 
but also by offering different peer groups and future prospects, that may all have an impact on 
criminal behaviour.  
 
  
                                                 
7
 Several papers have documented peer effects in criminal behaviour (see e.g. Kling et al. 2005, Bayer et al. 2009, 
Billings et al. 2014, 2018). 
 25 
Literature 
 
Aaltonen, M, Kivivuori, J., and Martikainen, P., (2011): “Social determinants of crime in a welfare 
state: Do they still matter?” Acta Sociologica, 54 (2): 161-181 
 
Anderson, D. M. (2014): “In school and out of trouble? The minimum dropout age and juvenile 
crime”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 96 (2), 318-331. 
 
Åslund, O, H Grönqvist, C Hall and J Vlachos (2018): “Education and Criminal Behavior: Insights 
from an Expansion of Upper Secondary School”, Labour Economics, ISSN: 0927-5371, Vol: 52, 
Page: 178-192  
 
Bayer, P., R. Hjalmarsson, and D. Pozen, (2009):  “Building Criminal Capital behind Bars: “Peer 
Effects in Juvenile Corrections,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2009), 105–147.  
 
Beatton, T., Kidd, M. P., Machin, S., and Sarkar, D. (2016): “Larrikin youth: New evidence on 
crime and schooling”, CEP Discussion Paper 1456. 
 
Bell, B., Costa, R., and S. Machin, (2018): “Why does education reduce crime?”, IZA Discussion 
Paper No 11805. 
 
Billings, S. B., Deming, D. J., & Rockoff, J. (2014): “School Segregation, Educational Attainment 
and Crime: Evidence from the End of Busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg”.  The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 129(1), 435-476.  
 
Billings S, Deming DJ, Ross S. (2018): “Partners in Crime”. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics. Forthcoming 
 
Brugård, K. H. and T. Falch, (2013): “Post-compulsory education and imprisonment”, Labour 
Economics, 23, 97-106. 
 
Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., and Titiunik, R. (2014): “Robust nonparametric confidence intervals 
for regression discontinuity designs”, Econometrica, 82(6), 2295-2326. 
 
 26 
Cook, P. J. and S. Kang. (2016): "Birthdays, Schooling, and Crime: Regression-Discontinuity 
Analysis of School Performance, Delinquency, Dropout, and Crime Initiation." American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics, 8(1): 33-57. 
 
Jacob, B., and L. Lefgren, (2003): ‘‘Are Idle Hands the Devil’s Work- shop? Incapacitation, 
Concentration, and Juvenile Crime,’’ American Economic Review 93, 1560–1577. 
 
Hjalmarsson, R., Holmlund, H., and Linquist, M. J. (2014): “The effect of education on criminal 
convictions and incarceration: Causal evidence from micro-data”, The Economic Journal, 125, 
1290-1326. 
 
Kling, J., J. Ludwig and L. Katz. (2005): “Neighborhood Effects on Crime 
for Female and Male Youth: Evidence from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment.” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (1): 87-130. 
 
Landersø, R., Nielsen, H. S. and Simonsen, M. (2016): “School Starting Age and the Crime-age 
Profile”. Economic Journal. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12325 
 
Lochner, L. and Moretti, E. (2004): “The effect of education on crime: evidence from prison 
inmates, arrests and self-reports”, American Economic Review, vol. 94(1), pp. 155–89. 
 
Lochner, L. (2011): “Non-Production Benefits of Education: Crime, Health and Good Citizenship”, 
in: E. Hanushek, S. Machin and L. Woessmann (eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Education, 
Volume 4, North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 183–282. 
 
Luallen, J. (2006): “School’s Out . . . Forever: A Study of Juvenile Crime, At-Risk Youths and 
Teacher Strikes”, ‘Journal of Urban Economics 59 (2006), 75–103. 
 
Machin, S., Marie, O., and Vujic, S., (2011): “The Crime Reducing Effect of Education.” Economic 
Journal 121 (552), 463–484. 
 
Machin, S., Marie, O., and Vujic, S., (2012): “Youth Crime and Education Expansion.” German 
Economic Review, vol. 13(4), pages 366-384, November. 
  
 27 
Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 Application process timeline 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Crime-age profile by crime types 
 
  
Notes: Crimes convicted at court by age and crime type. On the spot fines by police are excluded from the figure. 
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Figure 3 Distribution of observations with respect to cut-off grade 
 
 
Notes: Distance to cut-off score in the program with lowest admission threshold among the applicant’s applications. 
Admission scores are re-scaled so that one unit change of the GPA has the same effect on the standardized score in all 
programmes. 
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Figure 4 The effect of exceeding admission threshold on admissions, enrollment and education 
 
  
Notes: The figure shows the share of those admitted to any post-compulsory programme (left) and share of those 
enrolled to any post-compulsory program by next fall (left) plotted against track-specific standardized running 
variable.  The sample is all programs with at least 5 applicants on both side of the cut off for which the program 
was the best chance of gaining admission (sample 2). The lines represent local second order polynomial estimates 
using the edge kernel and the optimal IK bandwidths. The dots correspond to the sample means by 0.1 GPA 
point bins.  
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Figure 5 The effect of exceeding admission threshold on crime 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the share of those who had committed any crime within two years (left) within ten years 
(right).  The sample is all programmess with at least 5 applicants on both side of the cut off for which the 
programme was the best chance of gaining admission (sample 2). The lines represent local second order 
polynomial estimates using the edge kernel and the optimal IK bandwidths. The dots correspond to the sample 
means by 0.1 GPA point bins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 31 
Figure 6 The effect of admission on crime: males 
 
Notes: Each panel plots the effect of admission on annual crime from years 0 to 10 obtained from separate regressions. 
Year 0 is defined as August 15
th
 the fall when starting ninth grade until August 14
th
 the following year, year 1 is the 
admission year August 15
th
-August 14
th 
following year etc. We use bandwidth 0.5 for all outcomes and for all 
programs.  
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Figure 7 The effect of admission on cumulative crime: males 
 
 
Notes: Each panel plots the effect of admission on cumulative crime since admission (year 1) from years 1 to 10 
obtained from separate regressions. Year 0 is defined as August 15
th
 the fall when starting ninth grade until August 14
th
 
the following year, year 1 is the admission year August 15
th
-August 14
th 
following year etc. We use bandwidth 0.5 for 
all outcomes and for all programmes.  
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Figure 8 The effect of admission on cumulative crime, by crime type: males 
 
 
Notes: Each panel plots the effect of admission on cumulative crime from years 0 to 10 obtained from separate 
regressions. Year 0 is defined as August 15
th
 the fall when starting ninth grade until August 14
th
 the following year, year 
1 is the admission year August 15
th
-August 14
th 
following year etc. We use bandwidth 0.5 for all outcomes and for all 
programmes.  
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Figure 9 The effect of admission on inactivity: males 
 
 
Notes: Each panel plots the effect of admission on NEET (inactivity) status since admission (year 1) from years 1 to 10 
obtained from separate regressions. Year 0 is defined as August 15
th
 the fall when starting ninth grade until August 14
th
 
the following year, year 1 is the admission year August 15
th
-August 14
th 
following year etc. We use bandwidth 0.5 for 
all outcomes and for all programmes.  
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Table 1 Effect of being above admission threshold/admission on crime 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
 Enrolled 
to 
secondary 
Crime by 
year 1 
Crime by 
year 3 
Crime by 
5 
Crime by 
10 
 
 Panel A  All 
Reduced form:  0.326*** 0.003 -0.011 -0.036** -0.043*  
(0.035) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) (0.025)  
First stage: 0.614*** 0.701*** 0.710*** 0.688*** 0.678***  
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031) (0.039)  
LATE: Admitted 0.531*** 0.004 -0.015 -0.052** -0.064*  
 (0.043) (0.009) (0.020) (0.024) (0.037)  
Mean below* 0.307 0.027 0.080 0.127 0.187  
Observations 9,689 14,817 12,469 11,376 7,955  
Optimal bandwith  0.364 0.531 0.442 0.407 0.300  
 Panel B  Males 
Reduced form: 0.396*** 0.006 -0.051* -0.082*** -0.077*  
 (0.048) (0.015) (0.030) (0.029) (0.041)  
First Stage: 0.757*** 0.686*** 0.751*** 0.706*** 0.725***  
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.037)  
LATE: Admitted 0.523*** 0.009 -0.068* -0.116*** -0.105*  
 (0.058) (0.021) (0.040) (0.042) (0.056)  
Mean below* 0.335 0.046 0.127 0.201 0.266  
Observations 4384 5653 5654 5637 4247  
Optimal bandwith   0.320 0.386 0.383 0.406 0.295  
 Panel C  Females 
Reduced form: 0.325*** -0.001 0.010 -0.006 -0.008  
 (0.059) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.018)  
First Stage: 0.489*** 0.663*** 0.636*** 0.619*** 0.582***  
 (0.060) (0.045) (0.030) (0.036) (0.039)  
LATE: Admitted 0.664*** -0.002 0.017 -0.009 -0.013  
 (0.080) (0.009) (0.013) (0.022) (0.032)  
Mean below* 0.284 0.008 0.033 0.054 0.087  
Observations 4146 4054 9167 6735 5666  
Optimal bandwith  0.298 0.321 0.669 0.521 0.441  
 
Notes: Each entry is an estimated effect from a local linear regression , triangular kernel weights and a 
program-specific optimal bandwidth (using CCT2014 bandwidth selection rule). Robust standard errors 
clustered at program-level are displayed in parentheses. *Mean below admission cutoff within optimal 
bandwidth. Optimal bandwidth is the mean bandwidth across all observations measured as GPA units.  
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Table 2 Effects by type of crime by year 5 and by year 10, males. 
 
Panel A) Cumulative crime by time 5: 
 Violence Property Traffic Other 
Reduced form: 
 
0.010 -0.022 -0.036 -0.047** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.019) 
First Stage: 0.709*** 0.730*** 0.754*** 0.710*** 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) 
LATE: Admitted 0.014 -0.030 -0.047 -0.067** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.038) (0.027) 
Mean below* 0.045 0.082 0.095 0.064 
Observations 5330 5192 4784 5259 
Optimal bandwith  0.371 0.375 0.318 0.369 
 
Panel B) Cumulative crime by time 10: 
 Violence Property Traffic Other 
Reduced form: 
 
0.015 -0.018 -0.051 -0.068** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.039) (0.027) 
First Stage: 0.720*** 0.732*** 0.737*** 0.730*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) 
LATE: Admitted 0.021 -0.025 -0.070 -0.093** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.053) (0.036) 
Mean below* 0.073 0.108 0.146 0.101 
Observations 5089 4701 3966 4503 
Optimal bandwith  0.357 0.338 0.282 0.305 
 
Notes: Outcomes measure whether individual has committed at least one crime in the category by the given 
time (year 5 or year 10 after admission). . *Mean below admission cutoff within optimal bandwidth. 
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Table 3 Effects during school years and summer breaks, males. 
  
 Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  
 School 
year 
Summer  School 
year 
Summer  School 
year 
Summer  
 Panel A  All 
Reduced form: 
 
0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.030 -0.028 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.019) (0.012) (0.026) (0.017) 
First Stage: 0.678*** 0.770*** 0.735*** 0.778*** 0.720*** 0.696*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.036) (0.031) (0.036) 
LATE: Admitted 0.004 -0.002 -0.015 -0.002 -0.041 -0.040 
 (0.023) (0.012) (0.026) (0.015) (0.036) (0.025) 
Mean below* 0.035 0.017 0.067 0.028 0.106 0.042 
Observations 5229 5862 6082 5528 5742 4728 
Optimal bandwith  0.362 0.416 0.404 0.395 0.395 0.326 
 
Notes: See text under table 1. 
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Table 4 Effect of being above admission threshold/admission on activity and education  
 NEET year 
1 
Degree by 
year 3 
Degree by 
year 10 
 Panel A  All 
Reduced form:  -0.075*** 0.148*** 0.042** 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.020) 
First stage: 0.704*** 0.646*** 0.725*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
LATE: Admitted -0.107*** 0.229*** 0.058** 
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.029) 
Mean below* 0.167 0.123 0.718 
Observations 10,329 12,950 12,128 
Optimal 
bandwidth  
0.364 0.470 0.454 
 Panel B  Males 
Reduced form: -0.099*** 0.129*** 0.072** 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) 
First Stage: 0.689*** 0.644*** 0.759*** 
 (0.038) (0.029) (0.034) 
LATE: Admitted -0.143*** 0.200*** 0.095** 
 (0.044) (0.041) (0.040) 
Mean below* 0.151 0.124 0.680 
Observations 4494 7931 6395 
Optimal 
bandwidth  
0.320 0.541 0.499 
 Panel C  Females 
Reduced form: -0.077** 0.190*** 0.015 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
First Stage: 0.541*** 0.647*** 0.630*** 
 (0.052) (0.040) (0.053) 
LATE: Admitted -0.142** 0.294*** 0.024 
 (0.058) (0.047) (0.053) 
Mean below* 0.197 0.122 0.756 
Observations 3571 6664 5036 
Optimal bandwith  0.291 0.477 0.372 
 
Notes: Each entry is an estimated effect from a local linear regression , triangular kernel weights and a 
program-specific optimal bandwidth (using CCT2014 bandwidth selection rule). Robust standard errors 
clustered at program-level are displayed in parentheses. NEET 1st  (2nd) is an indicator whether individual is 
not in education nor in employment at end of the admission year, or end of the next calendar year.  Degree 
in 3 (10) years, is an indicator whether individual has any post-compulsory degree within 3 (10) and a half 
years from the admission date. *Mean below admission cut-off within optimal bandwidth. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1 Finnish educational system 
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Figure A2  Crime-age profile by conviction  
 
 
Notes: The sample consists of all school applicants in Finland in years 1996-2003. Each cohort is followed from age 16 
until age 26.   
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Figure A3 Robustness to bandwidth choice to different outcomes, males: Enrolled year 1, Any 
crime by year 5, Property crime by year 5, Traffic crime by year 5 
 
 
 
Notes:  Each panel plots the effect of admission on outcome from separate regressions that use different bandwidth. 
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Table A1 Characteristics of total data vs. estimations samples: all applicants 
    
  Total data Sample 1 Sample 2 
PANEL A: Programme level information 
    
Programme characteristics    
Mean number of applicants 84.11 158.08   300.17 
High schools 0.24 0.34 0.59 
Lowest GPA among admitted 6.09 6.15 6.61 
No of programmes 16,969 4,169    669 
PANEL B: Individual level information 
 Total data Sample 1 Sample 2 
  Admitted Rejected Admitted Rejected Admitted Rejected 
Individual characteristics             
Male 0.51   0.52 0.51 0.57 0.46 0.55 
GPA 7.72 6.36 7.90 6.35 8.15 6.52 
Non-Finnish or Swedish 
speaker 
0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Lives in the 15 largest city 0.23 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.39 
Crime year 0 0.01   0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Parental background             
Father's income 33,531 30,727 36,266 30,475 40,434 32,571 
Father has secondary degree 0.71 0.63 0.74 0.63 0.77 0.65 
Father has HE 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.27 0.14 
Mother's income 22,840 21,318 23,971 21,451 25,919 22,801 
Mother has secondary degree 0.77 0.67 0.78 0.67 0.80 0.68 
Mother has HE 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.20 0.10 
Outcomes             
Crime within 3 yrs 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.03   0.10 
Crime within 10 yrs 0.11 0.24 0.10 0.25 0.08 0.21 
Secondary degree within 10 
yrs 
0.90 0.62 0.92 0.63 0.94 0.66 
No of individuals 411,351 18,895 16,0331 12,724 55,421 6,737 
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Table A2 Discontinuity of covariates at cut-off  
 
Variables    
 All Males Females 
Individual characteristics       
Male -0.007 (0.029)     
Crime before admission -0.003 (0.005) -0.003 (0.011) -0.003 (0.003) 
GPA  0.008 (0.009) 0.012 (0.015) 0.034** (0.014) 
Native language Finnish -0.010 (0.008) -0.012 (0.012) -0.013 (0.011) 
Native other than Finnish 
or Swedish 0.011 (0.007) 0.013 (0.010) 0.009 (0.010) 
Age at the time of 
graduation 0.028** (0.012) 0.021 (0.017) 0.043*** (0.014) 
Lives in the 15 largest city -0.012 (0.010) -0.005 (0.014) -0.019 (0.019) 
Parents       
Information on mother 0.001 (0.006) 0.010 (0.008) -0.004 (0.008) 
Information on father -0.007 (0.011) 0.028 (0.018) -0.032* (0.017) 
Information on both 
parents 0.005 (0.013) 0.032 (0.020) -0.029 (0.019) 
Father's income 1914 (5137) 6493 (9793) -2844 (2266) 
Father in NEET -0.005 (0.027) -0.053 (0.044) 0.012 (0.045) 
Father has post-
compulsory degree -0.018 (0.029) -0.052 (0.051) 0.018 (0.052) 
Father has HE 0.009 (0.020) -0.009 (0.035) 0.017 (0.028) 
Mother's income 797 (688) 1639 (1228) 1023 (1444) 
Mother in NEET 0.006 (0.022) 0.018 (0.027) 0.021 (0.041) 
Mother has post-
compulsory degree -0.024 (0.026) -0.019 (0.042) -0.063 (0.043) 
Mother has HE -0.005 (0.015) 0.027 (0.025) -0.014 (0.021) 
 
Notes: Each cell corresponds to coefficient from reduced-form regression (being above threshold). See text 
under table 1 for estimation details.  
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Table A3 Effects when controlling for covariates  
  
  
 Enrolled to 
secondary 
Crime by 1 Crime by 3 Crime by 5 Crime  by 10   
 Panel A  All 
LATE: Admitted  0.534*** 0.004 -0.020 -0.038 -0.056  
(0.045) (0.008) (0.020) (0.025) (0.039)  
Observations 8592 13245 11159 10196 7078  
 Panel B  Males 
LATE: Admitted  0.550*** 0.010 -0.079** -0.083* -0.116*  
 (0.060) (0.024) (0.040) (0.043) (0.061)  
Observations 3,896 5027 5062 5055 3797  
 Panel C  Females 
LATE: Admitted  0.610*** -0.004 0.013 -0.012 -0.034  
 (0.089) (0.011) (0.013) (0.024) (0.034)  
Observations 3689 3589 8182 5996 5023  
 
Notes: The covariates include Indicator for mother tongue, age at graduation (in years), indicator for living in 
one of the 15th largest municipalities in Finland, gender, mother/father found in the register, mother’s level of 
schooling. See text under table 1. 
 
Table A4 Effects with fixed bandwidth  
  
 Enrolled to 
secondary 
Crime by 1 Crime by 3 Crime by 5 Crime by 10 
 Panel A  All 
LATE: Admitted 0.544*** 0.010 -0.016 -0.059*** -0.050** 
(0.034) (0.010) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) 
Observations 13049 13049 13049 13049 13049 
 Panel B  Males 
LATE: Admitted 0.515*** 0.007 -0.050 -0.088** -0.049 
 (0.044) (0.019) (0.034) (0.036) (0.041) 
Observations 6905 6905 6905 6905 6905 
 Panel C  Females 
LATE: Admitted 0.599*** 0.008 0.010 -0.028 -0.036 
 (0.054) (0.007) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) 
Observations 6144 6144 6144 6144 6144 
 
Notes: Each entry is an estimated effect from a local linear regression. We use bandwidth 0.5 for all outcomes 
and for all programmes.   
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Table A5 Robustness to sampling: Sample 1 
 
  
 Enrolled to 
secondary 
Crime by 1 Crime by 3 Crime by 5 Crime by 
10 
 Panel A  All 
LATE: Admitted 0.538*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.039*** -0.036*** 
(0.020) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
Observations 24100 145500 108324 109696 109758 
Mean 0.345 0.043 0.113 0.171 0.238 
Optimal bandwidth .456 1.904 1.446 1.454 1.453 
 Panel B  Males 
LATE: Admitted 0.534*** -0.042*** -0.039** -0.051*** -0.040** 
 (0.025) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Observations 13468 57757 48903 49676 51156 
Mean 0.365 0.068 0.170 0.254 0.337 
Optimal bandwidth 0.453 1.460 1.254 1.267 1.298 
 Panel C  Females 
LATE: Admitted 0.548*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.018** -0.032*** 
 (0.032) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) 
Observations 12044 92421 76683 79249 69213 
Mean 0.314 0.010 0.035 0.117 0.105 
Optimal bandwidth 0.509 2.954 2.051 2.103 1.837 
 
Notes: Each entry is an estimated effect from a local linear regression, triangular kernel weights and a 
programme-specific optimal bandwidth (using CCT2014 bandwidth selection rule). Robust standard errors 
clustered at programme-level are displayed in parentheses. The sample include all applicants to tracks with 
at least 1 applicant on both side of the cut-off .  
 
 
 
  
